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14 Attorneys for Plaintiff
 15 JANE DOE

17 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
 18 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

22	JANE DOE, an individual)	Case No.
23)	
24	Plaintiff,)	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
25	v.)	
26	CITY OF RICHMOND; POLICE CHIEF)	1. VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
27	CHRIS MAGNUS; POLICE CHIEF)	<i>(Monell-Municipal liability based on</i>
28	ALLWYN BROWN; LT. BRIAN)	Supervisory violation);
	DICKERSON; LT. ANDRE HILL;)	2. VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983
	SERGEANT ARMONDO MORENO;)	<i>(Monell-Municipal liability based on</i>
	SERGEANT MIKE ROOD; OFFICER)	Supervisory violation);

1 JERRED TONG; OFFICER TERRANCE)
2 JACKSON; and Does 1-200, individually,)
3 jointly and severally.)

4 Defendants.)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)

- 3. **VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell-based on hiring, training, retention & ratification);**
- 4. **VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell-based on policy, practice, custom, pattern and training);**
- 5. **VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Due Process);**
- 6. **VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Conspiracy);**
- 7. **VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice through Witness Tampering);**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

INTRODUCTION

14
15
16
17 1. Defendants are City of Richmond police officers, lieutenants, sergeants, their
18 supervisors and employers. They are required and empowered to protect the weakest among us.
19 When weak and vulnerable victims come to them for support and protection, they have the
20 obligation to help, not further the horrors suffered by victims. Plaintiff JANE DOE was a victim,
21 trapped in the sex trade since she was a minor. She was exploited by pimps and made to sell her
22 body for money. When the named Defendant Police Officers met Plaintiff, they were legally
23 obligated to help her, not exploit her. Instead of providing her a way out of her exploitation,
24 the Defendant officers continued to victimize and exploit a teenage girl who needed to be rescued.

25 2. The Richmond Police Department, failed to properly supervise its officers, failed to
26 provide adequate training on identifying victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, allowed
27 improper access to criminal databases and failed to put in place adequate policy and training on
28 social media use.

1 3. These officers, their supervisors and city employers either directly engaged in, stood by
2 with a blind eye, or acted to cover up this modern-day slavery of JANE DOE by their own sworn
3 officers in order to engage in sexual acts with her. They expressly and/or implicitly coerced
4 JANE DOE to continue such acts for her so-called protection. These acts constitute unlawful forced
5 labor and sex trafficking amongst Richmond Police Department officers and have caused JANE
6 DOE to suffer unimaginable abuse and pain that she and her family will endure for the rest of their
7 lives.

8 **JURISDICTION**

9 4. This Court has jurisdiction over this lawsuit because the suit arises under 42 U.S.C. §
10 1983 and asserts facts showing that Defendants, and each of them, acted willfully, deliberately and
11 pursuant to a policy, custom and practice, and with reckless disregard of Plaintiff JANE DOE's
12 established Federal Constitutional rights.

13 5. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendants reside in
14 this district. Venue is also proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the events,
15 acts and omissions giving rise to this claim occurred in this district.

16 **PARTIES**

17 6. Plaintiff herein, fictitiously-named JANE DOE ('DOE'), is readily recognizable as a
18 Latino American female, and was at all times herein mentioned, a citizen of the United States and
19 resident of the State of California.

20 7. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, CITY OF RICHMOND ("CITY") is a
21 municipal corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
22 California.

23 8. Defendant RICHMOND POLICE DEPARTMENT ("RPD") is a division of the City of
24 Richmond, which at all times was operated, managed, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
25 CITY and which is a governmental organization of the State of California.

26 9. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, POLICE CHIEF CHRIS MAGNUS
27 ("CHIEF MAGNUS"), was the Richmond Police Department Chief throughout the period of
28 2006 through 2015, and is sued in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as Chief of the

1 Richmond Police Department.

2
3 10. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, POLICE CHIEF ALLWYN
4 BROWN (“CHIEF BROWN”), was the Richmond Police Department Chief throughout the period
5 of 2015 to the present, and is sued in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as Chief of
6 the Richmond Police Department.

7
8 11. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, LIEUTENANT BRIAN
9 DICKERSON (“LT. DICKERSON”), was head of the Richmond Police Department’s Office of
10 Internal Affairs throughout the period of 2013-2015, and is sued in his individual capacity, and in
11 his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Police Department.

12
13 12. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, LIEUTENANT ANDRE HILL
14 (“LT. HILL”), was an officer with the Richmond Police Department, and is sued in his
15 individual capacity, and in his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Police Department.

16
17 13. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, SERGEANT ARMONDO
18 MORENO, (“SGT. MORENO”), was an officer with the Richmond Police Department, and is
19 sued in his individual capacity, and in his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Police
20 Department.

21
22 14. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, SERGEANT MIKE ROOD, (“SGT.
23 ROOD”), was an officer with the Richmond Police Department, and is sued in his individual
24 capacity, and in his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Police Department.

25
26 15. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, OFFICER JERRED TONG
27 (“TONG”), was an officer with the Richmond Police Department, and is sued in his individual
28 capacity, and in his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Police Department.

16. That at all times herein mentioned, defendant, OFFICER TERRANCE JACKSON

1 (“JACKSON”), was an officer with the Richmond Police Department, and is sued in his
2 individual capacity, and in his capacity as an officer with the Richmond Police Department.

3 17. That at all times herein mentioned, DEFENDANTS CHIEF MAGNUS, CHIEF
4 BROWN, LT. DICKERSON, LT. ANDRE HILL, SGT ARMONDO MORENO, SGT
5 MIKE ROOD, OFFICER JERRED TONG and OFFICER TERRANCE JACKSON
6 acted under color of state law and within the course and scope of their employment with the
7 CITY and the Richmond Police Department.
8

9 18. That at all times herein mentioned, defendants, CHIEF MAGNUS and CHIEF
10 BROWN respectively, were employed by the CITY as the Richmond Police Department’s Chief of
11 Police.
12

13 19. That at all times herein mentioned, CHIEF MAGNUS, followed by CHIEF
14 BROWN, were the officials highest in the chain of command in the Richmond Police Department
15 and were the highest supervising policymakers in the Richmond Police Department.
16

17 20. That at all times herein mentioned LT. DICKERSON was the head of and in charge
18 of the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) of the RPD and in the chain of command to RPD’s Chief of
19 Police.
20

21 21. That at all times herein mentioned, LT. DICKERSON as head of the IAD, was a
22 supervising policymaker of the RPD.
23

24 22. That at all times herein mentioned, CHIEF MAGNUS, CHIEF BROWN, and
25 LT. DICKERSON are being sued herein in both their individual and official capacities.
26

27 **DOE DEFENDANTS**

28 23. Plaintiff does not know the true names and capacities, whether individual,
corporate, associate, or otherwise of DEFENDANT Does 1 through 200 inclusive, and therefore

1 sue these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend her complaint to allege their
2 true names and capacities when this has been ascertained.

3
4 **RATIFICATION, ADOPTION AND AUTHORIZATION**

5 24. DEFENDANT CITY and its managing agents, in both their individual and
6 official capacities, ratified, adopted and authorized each of the named DEFENDANTS and
7 managing agents' illegal conduct. DEFENDANT CITY, and its managing agents, in both their
8 individual and official capacities, knew, or should have known, that the named DEFENDANTS
9 and managing agents were engaging in illegal conduct and had been warned, informed, and given
10 prior notice of the illegal conduct. It is well established that when an employer ratifies the tortious
11 conduct of an employee, he or she becomes "liable for the employee's wrongful conduct as a joint
12 participant." *Fretland v. County of Humboldt* 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1489-1490 (1999). An
13 employer who fails to discipline an employee after being informed of that employee's improper
14 conduct can be deemed to have ratified that conduct. *Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co.*, 189
15 Cal. App. 3d 1420, 1430 (1987); *Iverson v. Atlas Pacific Engineering* 143 Cal. App. 3d 219,
16 228(1983). According to the court in *Iverson*, supra, if an employer is informed that an employee
17 has committed an intentional tort and nevertheless declines to "censure, criticize, suspend or
18 discharge" that employee, a claim can be made for ratification. *Id.*

19 25. Ratification is the voluntary election by a person to adopt in some manner, as his
20 own, an act which was purportedly done on his behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to
21 some or all persons, is to treat the act as if originally authorized by him. A purported agent's act
22 may be adopted expressly or it may be adopted by implication based on conduct of the
23 purported principal from which an intention to consent to or adopt the act may be fairly inferred,
24 including conduct which is inconsistent with any reasonable intention on his part, other than
25 that he intended approving and adopting it. *Fretland*, supra 69 Cal. App. 4th 1.

26 26. At all relevant times alleged herein, DEFENDANT CITY, and its managing
27 agents, in both their individual and official capacities, had actual and constructive knowledge of
28 Defendants', and managing agents', illegal conduct and has endorsed, ratified, and encouraged

1 Defendants' illegal behavior. DEFENDANT CITY, and its managing agents, in both their
2 individual and official capacities, failed to take any corrective action to protect employees and the
3 public from Defendants' illegal behavior.

4
5 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

6 27. At all times herein relevant, it was well known amongst police officers and
7 supervisory staff at the Richmond Police Department that a minor young woman was available to
8 them for sexual favors and pleasure in exchange for paid monies, protection, or other forms of
9 consideration.
10

11 28. The named Defendants, as well as other Richmond Police Department officers,
12 commanding officers, supervisory and support staff, were well aware of the existence of the
13 underage sex worker as their law enforcement colleagues at the Oakland Police Department
14 ("OPD"), Contra Costa Sheriff's Department ("CCSD"), Alameda County Sheriff's Office
15 ("ACSO"), Livermore Police Department ("LPD") and San Francisco Police Department ("SFPD")
16 shared such information, including the minor's contact information and recommendations as to
17 her services.
18

19 29. Rather than such information eliciting a concern that this young woman was
20 repeatedly being victimized as a sexually trafficked minor and thereby rescuing her from such
21 horror, DEFENDANTS, each and every one, selfishly chose to raise their own debased and
22 perverse desires above the desperation of a young, broken and vulnerable woman.
23

24 30. It was well known and accepted throughout the Bay Area law enforcement
25 community that underage girls were being sexually trafficked within their jurisdiction, and
26 that one in particular, PLAINTIFF JANE DOE, was singularly and exclusively available to them.
27

28 31. As such, PLAINTIFF JANE DOE's body and services were trafficked between

1 the hands of Oakland Police Officers, Contra Costa County and Alameda County Sheriff's
2 Deputies, San Francisco Police Officers, Livermore Police Officers and DEFENDANT RPD
3 POLICE OFFICERS. DEFENDANT RPD OFFICERS who received and obtained sexual offerings
4 and treatment from PLAINTIFF were open and notorious about such encounters throughout the
5 RPD. PLAINTIFF'S sexual exploitation by officers was well publicized throughout the RPD as was
6 the exploitation of sex workers in general a well acknowledged part of the RPD culture.
7 DEFENDANT RPD OFFICERS communicated and exchanged information amongst themselves
8 and others in the RPD, including supervisory staff in order to retain and perpetuate the availability of
9 PLAINTIFF's sexual services as an exclusively Department retained sex worker.

10 32. On information and belief, DEFENDANTS CHIEF MAGNUS and CHIEF
11 BROWN, had knowledge of RPD's culture, which included officers soliciting sex from JANE
12 DOE and similarly situated child sex workers and/or adult sex workers like
13 PLAINTIFF. As head of RPD's Internal Affairs Division, LT. DICKERSON also had knowledge
14 of RPD's culture that included officers soliciting sex from JANE DOE and similarly situated
15 minors, many of whom were sex trafficked like PLAINTIFF.

16 33. Despite such knowledge, CHIEF MAGNUS and CHIEF BROWN failed and
17 refused to adequately investigate its RPD OFFICERS who were soliciting PLAINTIFF, and as
18 such, acquiesced in their conduct. Furthermore, CHIEF MAGNUS, CHIEF BROWN, and head
19 of RPD's Internal Affairs Division LT. DICKERSON, failed to take any action against RPD
20 OFFICERS. Instead, these aforementioned policy and decision-makers allowed them to remain
21 employed as officers, expressly showing deliberate indifference to PLAINTIFF'S rights by
22 failing to act on information that her constitutional rights were being violated.

23 34. The aforesaid actions by CHIEF MAGNUS, CHIEF BROWN, and LT.
24 DICKERSON constituted a deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of PLAINTIFF
25 and other sex trafficked minors and sex workers with whom RPD OFFICERS solicited while in the
26 employ of RPD and under the supervision of DEFENDANTS CHIEF MAGNUS and CHIEF
27 BROWN.

28 35. Not one of these law enforcement departments or agencies, including the RPD,

1 permitted its officers or personnel to utilize child sex workers and/or adult sex workers and the
2 services they provide while acting within their employ or scope of their employment. Nevertheless,
3 Officers at OPD, CCSD, and DEFENDANT OFFICERS at RPD relied on and displayed their
4 status and power as law enforcement officers to coerce, frighten and threaten PLAINTIFF into
5 continuing to provide sexual services in exchange for money and immunity from future arrest and
6 prosecution.

7 36. As mandated by RPD regulations, DEFENDANT OFFICERS were in possession of
8 their firearm and badge during their sexual encounters with PLAINTIFF. PLAINTIFF was fearful
9 that she would face repercussions if she refrained from catering to DEFENDANT
10 OFFICERS' requests for sexual contact.

11 37. At all times while PLAINTIFF JANE DOE was explicitly and conspicuously a
12 sex trafficked minor, DEFENDANT RPD OFFICERS, as well as other RPD police officers,
13 personnel and staff, were not provided with necessary and adequate training to identify victims of
14 sexual abuse and sexual trafficking.

15 38. Having been sex trafficked since she was in high school, PLAINTIFF JANE
16 DOE, as well as many other sex trafficked minors, suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
17 ("PTSD"), which is a disability recognized under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C.
18 12202; 42 U.S.C. 12131(2).

19
20 39. DEFENDANTS CITY and RPD failed to provide its law enforcement personnel
21 with training, supervision, or education on PTSD and/or instruction on how to interact with
22 individuals, like sexually trafficked minors and other sex workers. After extensive bay area media
23 attention, the Police Department's Office of Professional Accountability led an investigation into
24 officer misconduct, and identified eleven current and former police personnel that were
25 involved in misconduct. As a result of this misconduct, disciplinary actions are being
26 recommended as follows: One officer is proposed to be terminated from employment; One officer
27 is proposed to be demoted; Two officers are proposed to be suspended, one for 80 hours, and
28

1 the other for 120 hours; Five officers are proposed to receive letters of reprimand.

2 40. According to Richmond Mayor Tom Butt: “The City of Richmond has worked
3 very hard to make the Richmond Police Department a national model for community-
4 involved policing. I am both disappointed and outraged that the individual behavior of some
5 Richmond police officers has brought discredit to the department and serves to undermine
6 community trust. I know that this outrage is shared by my colleagues on the Richmond City
7 Council.”
8

9 41. “I am sorry that the misconduct of these individuals has brought embarrassment to
10 the City of Richmond and the Richmond Police Department,” stated Richmond Police Chief Allwyn
11 Brown. “Police officers must be held to a higher standard with regard to their personal and
12 professional conduct because their effectiveness in serving the community depends on the
13 public’s trust. Integrity is indispensable to the position of police officer, and a breach of that
14 integrity will not be tolerated at the Richmond Police Department.”
15

16
17 **DEFENDANT TERRANCE JACKSON**

18 42. DEFENDANT TERRANCE JACKSON met Plaintiff when she was a high school
19 student. DEFENDANT JACKSON was assigned to her school as a resource officer and befriended
20 Plaintiff. DEFENDANT JACKSON told Plaintiff that he and the whole school, including the
21 students and the principal, knew that she was working as an underage child sex worker. Given
22 this knowledge, DEFENDANT JACKSON had an obligation to report the abuse he knew Plaintiff
23 was suffering. Nevertheless, DEFENDANT JACKSON did not make any efforts to assist
24 Plaintiff from being sexually exploited and trafficked.

25 43. On an occasion after Plaintiff left high school, DEFENDANT JACKSON
26 responded to Plaintiff’s home while on duty and in a City of Richmond patrol car. Plaintiff came
27 out of her home wearing only a robe. When she greeted DEFENDANT JACKSON, while in full
28 uniform and on duty as a Richmond Police officer, he asked Plaintiff to show him her breasts, and

1 when she did, he groped Plaintiff's breasts.

2
3 **DEFENDANT ARMANDO MORENO**

4 44. In or around February to April of 2016, PLAINTIFF was walking down 23rd Street
5 in the City of Richmond in an area known to RPD officers as a hub for human trafficking of child
6 sex workers and/or adult sex workers. City of Richmond Police Officer DEFENDANT ARMANDO
7 MORENO drove past JANE DOE in a patrol car and glared at her. He continued to drive and
8 pulled his car over to the curb about a block away from where he spotted her.

9 45. PLAINTIFF continued walking and eventually made it to where Officer Moreno
10 had pulled his car over. The two talked for approximately 30 minutes and at the end of the
11 conversation the two exchanged phone numbers, with Officer Moreno promising to connect
12 PLAINTIFF with resources that could help her out of the sex exploitation industry. As events
13 unfolded, this promise was merely a ploy to gain PLAINTIFF's confidence in order to obtain sexual
14 favors from PLAINTIFF.

15 46. Approximately 1-2 hours later, Officer Moreno contacted PLAINTIFF and told
16 her he had some papers he wanted to give her that could assist her with getting out of the "life."
17 They met in the parking lot of a church close to PLAINTIFF's home. Officer Moreno gave her the
18 pamphlets he promised and no sexual interaction took place.

19 47. Time passed and PLAINTIFF texted Officer Moreno to thank him. During the
20 conversation, he asked PLAINTIFF if she had the Kik smartphone application – which would
21 allow them to communicate on something other than his work phone. She replied "yes" and they
22 began communicating through Kik.

23 48. Later that same month, they again met up in the church parking lot near
24 PLAINTIFF'S home. This time their interaction turned sexual. Officer Moreno groped her
25 breasts and she rubbed his exposed penis.

26 49. The next time they met up, Officer Moreno took her on a date to Berkeley to the hot
27 tubs. When he picked her up to take her to the hot tubs, Officer Moreno claimed he had just finished
28 a training workshop and his wife didn't know that he got out early. Officer Moreno had sex with

1 PLAINTIFF at the hot tubs.

2 50. After news of the police scandal broke and PLAINTIFF had given an interview to
3 the City of Richmond Police Department's Internal Affairs Department, she called Officer Moreno.
4 He did not answer the call, but instead had a different officer call her back. That yet-to-be
5 identified Officer asked her the details of what she told Internal Affairs and whether she
6 disclosed what Officer Moreno and she had done when he was on duty.

7 51. PLAINTIFF had sex with Officer Moreno in exchange for him providing protection
8 and confidential police information. To that end, on one occasion, Officer Moreno permitted
9 PLAINTIFF to review a police report pertaining to a sexual assault that had been committed
10 against one of her friends. In addition, on one of the many occasions she was working on 23rd
11 Street in Richmond, he sent her a text and told her "it's going to get hot." As she began to walk
12 away from 23rd Street, a Richmond Police Officer detained her, placing her in handcuffs.
13 Consistent with the protection PLAINTIFF received in exchange for sexual favors, the Officer
14 immediately released her without issuing a citation or arresting her.

15
16 **DEFENDANT MIKE ROOD**

17 52. Sometime during February and March of 2016, Plaintiff met City of Richmond
18 Police Officer DEFENDANT MIKE ROOD. They began a sexual relationship that included him
19 meeting her for sex on several occasions in front of the church near PLAINTIFF's home. He
20 confided in her his foot fetish and would often text and/or call to ask questions about her feet.
21 DEFENDANT ROOD knew PLAINTIFF was a sex worker and took advantage of his status as a
22 police officer by coercing her into having sexual encounters in exchange for providing her
23 protection from arrest and prosecution.

24 **DEFENDANT JERRED TONG**

25 53. Sometime during 2015, City of Richmond Police Officer DEFENDANT JERRED
26 TONG met PLAINTIFF through social media. Initially, PLAINTIFF did not know he was a
27 police officer, although he later revealed that to her during subsequent conversations. She later
28

1 learned he was a school resource officer at the high school from which she graduated. They later
2 agreed to meet up in person.

3 54. One night, Officer Tong visited PLAINTIFF's home while on duty, as he was
4 wearing his uniform and driving a marked patrol car. They spoke on her front porch. After they
5 spoke for a short while, he leaned in to steal a kiss from her. He kissed her on the mouth and she
6 felt his erect penis through his police uniform.

7 55. Over the next several weeks, they continued to meet and engage in sexual
8 activity. During the next two times they met, they exchanged oral sex, with PLAINTIFF
9 performing fellatio and Officer Tong performing cunnilingus on her in his car while parked in front
10 of her house.

11 56. PLAINTIFF engaged in the sexual encounters in exchange for protection and
12 access to confidential police information. Officer Tong supported and promoted PLAINTIFF's
13 prostitution activities. For example, he would ask her to send him pictures and suggest outfits and
14 poses for her prostitution ads. She also asked him for confidential information about a family
15 member's recent arrest.

16 **DEFENDANT ANDRE HILL**

17 57. PLAINTIFF first met DEFENDANT ANDRE HILL while she was in high school
18 and he was working as a Richmond Police Officer. Shortly thereafter, he started grooming her,
19 preparing her for his sexual advances. He would routinely call her and tell her to stand in the
20 front picture window of her home that faces the street. He would instruct her to disrobe and
21 flash her breasts at him while he drove by. PLAINTIFF engaged in the sexual relationship in
22 exchange for receiving protection and confidential information from Officer Hill. For example,
23 Officer Hill called her and asked whether she was working the "blade." The blade is slang for the
24 street where sex workers work in Richmond. She told him no and asked why, to which he replied
25 that, "it was going to get hot." This phrase meant that there was going to be a sting and/or police
26 activity on 23rd Street.

27 58. DEFENDANTS CITY and RPD knew, or should have known, that sex trafficked
28 minors, like PLAINTIFF JANE DOE, and/or sex workers with PTSD, like JANE DOE, are

1 vulnerable and susceptible to coercion by law enforcement officials, who use their position and
2 authority to exploit women like PLAINTIFF JANE DOE on account of their disabilities.

3 59. DEFENDANTS CITY and RPD lacked a policy or procedure to protect persons
4 similarly situated to PLAINTIFF from officers, like DEFENDANT RPD OFFICERS, who
5 exploited PLAINTIFF's disability, which she shares with other similarly situated sex trafficked
6 minors and sex workers.

7
8 **FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**
9 **AGAINST CHIEF MAGNUS AND CHIEF BROWN**
10 **(Supervisory Liability for Section 1983 Violations)**

11 60. PLAINTIFF repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as
12 though fully set forth at length herein.

13 61. CHIEF MAGNUS' and CHIEF BROWN'S failure and refusal to adequately
14 investigate RPD OFFICERS, failure to take any corrective action against them, allowing RPD
15 OFFICERS to remain employed as police officers with the RPD, engaging in gross negligence in
16 supervising them, and engaging in deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act
17 on information that PLAINTIFF's constitutional rights were being violated by RPD OFFICERS,
18 subject CHIEF MAGNUS and CHIEF BROWN to supervisory liability for the sexual abuses
19 perpetrated upon PLAINTIFF by DEFENDANT RPD OFFICERS. Such conduct entitles
20 PLAINTIFF to recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.

21 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays judgment as herein below set forth.

22 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**
23 **AGAINST LT. DICKERSON**

24 **(Supervisory Liability for Section 1983 Violations)**

25 62. PLAINTIFF repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as
26 though fully set forth at length herein.

27 63. As head of RPD's Internal Affairs Division, LT. DICKERSON's failure and
28 refusal to adequately investigate RPD OFFICERS, failure to take any corrective action against
them, allowing them to remain employed as police officers with the RPD, and engaging in

1 deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information that PLAINTIFF's
2 constitutional rights were being violated by RPD OFFICERS, subject LT. DICKERSON to
3 supervisory liability for the sexual abuses perpetrated upon PLAINTIFF by DEFENDANT RPD
4 OFFICERS. Such conduct entitles PLAINTIFF to recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.

5 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays judgment as herein below set forth.

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7 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**
8 **AGAINST CITY and RPD**

9 **(Negligent Hiring, Training, Retention & Ratification Section 1983**
10 **Violations)**

11 64. PLAINTIFF repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as
12 though fully set forth at length herein.

13 65. The aforesaid conduct by RPD OFFICERS and the injuries to PLAINTIFF were
14 the result of negligence by the CITY in its hiring, training, and retention of RPD OFFICERS.

15 66. None of the named Defendants were reprimanded, admonished and/or disciplined
16 while the exploitation was occurring. Instead, supervisors who knew and/or should have known
17 about the ongoing exploitation chose to turn a blind eye and/or remain complicit in the cover-up
18 until after the exploitation and conspiracy was exposed to the public. The CITY and Defendant
19 supervisors' conduct amounted to ratifying and condoning the Defendant Officers' unlawful
20 conduct.

21 67. Each of the five named officers knew that PLAINTIFF was an adult sex worker
22 and had been trafficked as a child sex worker. A reasonably prudent and properly trained
23 police officer having met PLAINTIFF would have provided support or resources to PLAINTIFF.
24 The fact that each of the five DEFENDANT OFFICERS decided to also exploit the young and
25 vulnerable JANE DOE for sex is evidence of a total lack of proper training regarding the
26 impropriety of exploiting victims of human trafficking by providing protection in exchange for
27 sexual favors.

28 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays judgment as herein below set forth.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST THE CITY

(42 U.S.C. 1983 Monell based on policy, practice and custom)

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68. PLAINTIFF repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as though fully set forth at length herein

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69. That by virtue of CHIEF MAGNUS and CHIEF BROWN’S failure and refusal to adequately investigate RPD OFFICERS, failure to take any corrective action against them, allowing them to remain employed as police officers with the RPD, engaging in gross negligence in supervising them, and engaging in deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information that PLAINTIFF’s constitutional rights were being violated by RPD OFFICERS, the CITY OF RICHMOND, which employed these policymakers during the relevant time period, exhibited a de facto and unofficial custom, policy and usage of unconstitutional conduct that was so persistent and widespread and thus, deliberately indifferent, that it is incontrovertibly sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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70. Each of the five officers knew that PLAINTIFF was a sex worker and had been trafficked as a sex worker while a child. A reasonably prudent and properly trained police officer having met PLAINTIFF would have provided support or resources to PLAINTIFF. The fact that each of the five DEFENDANT OFFICERS decided to exploit the young and vulnerable PLAINTIFF is evidence of a widespread and persistent custom of exploiting sex workers by providing protection in exchange for sexual favors.

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WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays judgment as herein below set forth.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

AGAINST DEFENDANTS HILL, MORENO, ROOD, TONG, AND JACKSON

(42 U.S.C. 1983 based on Fourteenth Amendment)

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71. PLAINTIFF repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as though fully set forth at length herein.

1 awareness of such undertakings and by refraining from investigating and taking corrective action
2 against the involved officers, LT. DICKERSON acted in concert with said involved officers
3 and thus, perpetuated the constitutional violations incurred by PLAINTIFF.

4 WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays judgment as herein below set forth.

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6 **SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION**
7 **AGAINST ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS and DOES 1-200**
8 **VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)**
9 **(Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice through Witness Tampering)**

10 77. PLAINTIFF repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth above as
11 though fully set forth at length herein.

12 78. Various Defendant Richmond Police Department Officers agreed, conspired and
13 took overt acts to prevent Plaintiff from testifying against various Richmond Police
14 Department Officers by sending Plaintiff to Stuart, Florida, alone, under the pretext that Plaintiff
15 needed to be institutionalized in a drug treatment program.

16 79. Defendant Richmond Police Department Officers knew at all relevant times that
17 Plaintiff has given testimony and statements to law enforcement departments in Oakland, San
18 Francisco, Richmond and other departments regarding sexual abuse by various Richmond
19 Police Department Officers and police officers in various police departments in the San Francisco
20 Bay Area.

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22 80. Defendant Richmond Police Department Officers knew at all relevant times that
23 Plaintiff's testimony could result in criminal and civil prosecution and departmental discipline of
24 Richmond Police Department Officers. In order to silence Plaintiff's testimony, Defendant
25 Richmond Police Department Officers agreed, conspired and took overt acts to prevent Plaintiff
26 from testifying against various Richmond Police Department Officers by sending Plaintiff to
27 Stuart, Florida.
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